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REGULATING JUDICIAL MISCONDUCT 
AND DIVINING "GOOD BEHAVIOR" 
FOR FEDERAL JUDGES 
Harry T. Edwards* 
PROLOGUE 
In recent years, we have witnessed an unprecedented number of 
instances in which federal judges have been accused of criminal behav-
ior and other serious acts of misconduct. This raises major concerns 
regarding the scope and enforcement of canons of conduct for mem-
bers of the judicial branch. It would be presumptuous for anyone to 
suggest a complete understanding of the notion of "good behavior" for 
federal judges, or to claim a fully satisfactory prescription for the 
problem of ·~udicial misconduct." That is not my object. In reflecting 
on these issues, however, I have come to realize that I may not share 
certain assumptions that appear to underlie recent legislative enact-
ments, scholarly proposals, and judicial initiatives directed at the regu-
lation of judicial conduct. 
In defining "good behavior" for federal judges, and in seeking solu-
tions for judicial misconduct and disability, I start with the principle 
of judicial independence. At the birth of our nation, Alexander Hamil-
ton charted one of the fundamental precepts upon which our system of 
government is founded: 
[The] independence of the judges is ... requisite to guard the constitu-
tion and the rights of individuals [against legislative encroachments and] 
from the effects of those ill humours which the arts of designing men, or 
the influence of particular conjunctures, sometimes disseminate among 
the people themselves . . . . 1 
For the nearly 200 years that have passed since Hamilton wrote these 
words, we have endeavored to preserve an independent judiciary as a 
"citadel of the public justice and the public security."2 Our Founding 
Fathers were clear in their determination to reject the English tradi-
tion which had fostered legislative interference with the regular courts 
• Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. B.S. 
1962, Cornell University; J.D. 1965, University of Michigan. The author wishes to acknowledge 
and express his appreciation for the research assistance of Melissa H. Maxman in the preparation 
of this article. 
1. THE F'EDERALisr No. 78, at 527 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961). 
2. Id. at 524. 
765 
766 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 87:765 
of justice.3 And, regardless of differences in legal philosophy, propo-
nents of judicial activism and judicial restraint alike have long agreed 
that, in order to fulfill its designated constitutional role, the judiciary 
must be independent in all ways that might affect substantive 
decisionmaking. 4 
This principle of judicial independence must be considered in con-
junction with the separation of powers doctrine5 in any effort to ad-
dress the problems of judicial misconduct and disability. Together, 
judicial independence and separation of powers make clear that the 
only constitutionally permissible way to regulate judicial misconduct 
and disability that does not involve impeachable action is through a 
system of judicial self-regulation unencumbered by any form of con-
gressional interference. 
I. JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AND JUDICIAL MISCONDUCT: 
THE PROBLEM IN CONTEXT 
The principle of judicial independence is embodied in article Ill, 
section 1 of the Constitution, which says that "[t]he Judges, both of 
the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during good 
Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services a Com-
pensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in 
Office."6 Although the Constitution does not explicitly say that fed-
eral judges are appointed for life, the Framers contemplated "perma-
nency in office" and rejected the possibility that judges might be 
required to stand for reelection or reappointment. 7 The Framers also 
explicitly rejected the English system of monarchical and legislative 
interference with the courts. 8 
The nondiminishable salary provision is also clearly intended to 
buttress the independence of individual judges. As explained by Alex-
ander Hamilton, "[n]ext to permanency in office, nothing can contrib-
ute more to the independence of the judges than a fixed provision for 
their support."9 The Framers also considered and rejected a perma-
nent salary. They chose instead to make it nondiminishable in the 
3. P. HOFFER & N. HULL, IMPEACHMENT IN AMERICA 1635-1805, at xi (1984). 
4. Hastings v. Judicial Conference of the United States, 770 F.2d 1093, 1104 (D.C. Cir. 1985) 
("Hastings I") (Edwards, J., concurring), cert. denied, 477 U.S. 904 (1986). 
5. See infra Part 11.B. 
6. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
7. THE FEDERALIST No. 78. 
8. See J. GOULDEN, THE BENCHWARMERS IO (1974) (noting the colonists' grievance, as 
recited in the Declaration of Independence, that King George had "made judges dependent on 
his will alone for the tenure of their office"); P. HOFFER & N. HULL, supra note 3, at xi. 
9. THE FEDERALIST, supra note 1, No. 79, at 531. 
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event that inflation would later render "penurious and inadequate'' a 
salary considered high when set; thus, the salary provision "afford[ed] 
a better prospect of [the judges'] independence than is discoverable in 
the constitutions of any of the states[ ] in regard to their own 
judges."10 
Moreover, the Framers designed a deliberately cumbersome re-
moval mechanism, impeachment by the House of Representatives11 
and removal upon conviction by two-thirds of the Senate, 12 to provide 
additional protection of the judiciary against congressional politics. 
The Senate was chosen as the adjudicator, because, according to Ham-
ilton, the Senate's "confidence ... in its own situation" would enable it 
to be impartial by remaining "unawed and uninfluenced" by either the 
accused or his accusers. 13 And of course, the two-thirds majority 
needed for conviction was considered an important deterrent to con-
viction on spurious charges. 
This principle of judicial independence is actually an outgrowth of 
the separation of powers doctrine. As James Madison put it in The 
Federalist, 
In order to lay a due foundation for that separate and distinct exercise of 
the different powers of government, which to a certain extent, is admit-
ted on all hands to be essential to the preservation of liberty, it is evident 
that each department should have a will of its own; and consequently 
should be so constituted, that the members of each should have as little 
agency as possible in the appointment of the members of the others .... 
It is equally evident that members of each department should be as 
little dependent as possible on those of the others, for the emoluments 
annexed to their offices. Were the executive magistrate, or the judges, 
not independent of the legislature in this particular, their independence 
in every other would be merely nominal. 14 
Thus, under our constitutional scheme, judges are given broad in-
dependence through life tenure without salary diminution and protec-
tion against arbitrary removal from office. That independence is 
checked, however, by the requirement of article III that the holder of a 
judicial office serve with "good Behavior."15 But an anomaly inheres 
in this arrangement. Under article II, a judge is subject to impeach-
ment and removal only upon conviction by the Senate of "Treason, 
10. Id. at 532. 
11. U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 2, cl. 5. 
12. U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6. 
13. THE FEDERALIST, supra note 1; No. 65, at 441 (emphasis in original). 
14. Id. No. 51, at 348-49. Madison was speaking on the importance ofthejudiciary's inde-
pendence from the appointing authority. 
15. U.S. CoNST. art. III, § 1. 
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Bribery or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors."16 Consequently, a 
judge may remain in office - and not be subject to impeachment -
even in the face of serious misconduct or disability. In other words, 
even though the Constitution imposes a standard of "good Behavior," 
it does not sanction the removal of a judge from office for every serious 
act of misconduct. 
This constitutional void has been magnified in the public view in 
recent years, as several judges have been accused of egregious miscon-
duct and official wrongdoing. In 1986, for the first time in fifty years, 
a federal judge was removed from office through impeachment.17 In 
the last three years, three federal judges have faced impeachment 
charges: one has been impeached and convicted; one has been im-
peached and is now awaiting trial before the Senate; and one case is 
still pending before the House of Representatives. 18 Prior to 1986, 
only ten federal judges had ever been impeached by the House, and 
only four of those judges were convicted and removed from office.19 
The recent news is indisputably troubling. Aggravating the specta-
cle of the impeachments has been the fact that two of the cited judges 
went to prison while still in office, one for tax fraud20 and the other for 
perjury.21 Both of these judges continued to draw their salaries while 
in prison pending their impeachments.22 
Probably the most noteworthy case among these recent instances 
of alleged judicial misconduct is the one involving Judge Alcee Has-
tings of the Southern District of Florida. Judge Hastings has been 
involved in extended and unusual litigation, attracting the most press 
interest. In 1983, Hastings was acquitted by a jury of criminal bribery 
charges;23 yet, in 1988, Hastings was impeached by the House of Rep-
resentatives on seventeen articles of impeachment, covering, among 
other things, the bribery and perjury charges of which he was acquit-
16. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4. 
17. That judge was Nevada District Court Chief Judge Harry Claiborne. See, e.g., Senate 
Convicts Judge of "High Crimes, "Wash. Post, Oct. 10, 1986, at Al, col. 3. Before Claiborne, the 
last judge impeached was Florida District Court Judge Halsted L. Ritter in 1936, for improprie· 
ties in a receivership case. J. BORKIN, THE CORRUPT JUDGE 199-200, 243-44 (1962). 
18. See Impeachment in the House, Wash. Post, Aug. 9, 1988, at A19, col. 1. 
19. See id. 
20. See United States v. Claiborne, 727 F.2d 842, 843 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 829 
(1984). 
21. This was Southern District of Mississippi Chief Judge Walter Nixon. See U.S. Judge 
Convicted of Peljury; Cleared of Accepting Illegal Gift, N.Y. Times, Feb. 10, 1986, at Al, col. 3. 
22. See Panel To Seek Impeachment of Judge, N.Y. Times, July 8, 1988, at AS, col. 3; Im· 
peachment Hearing Is Urged for U.S. Judge, N.Y. Times, Mar. 17, 1988, at A21, col. 5. 
23. See Hastings I, 770 F.2d at 1097; see also Judge Acquitted in 1983 Says Panel Wants Him 
Impeached, N.Y. Times, Aug. 27, 1986, at Al4, col. 5. 
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ted in 1983.24 From a theoretical standpoint, Hastings' situation raises 
important constitutional questions, not only about the impeachment 
standard, but also more generally about the grant of life tenure to fed-
eral judges, the required standard of conduct for members of the judi-
ciary, and the appropriate regulators of breaches of this ethic. In 
1985, and again in 1987, Judge Hastings challenged the constitutional-
ity of the statute that authorized the Judicial Conference to investigate 
him after his criminal acquittal.25 Thus far, all of his challenges have 
failed. But the problems highlighted by the Hastings case suggest 
questions of the greatest significance in any consideration of judicial 
misconduct. 
Nineteen years ago, in an oft-quoted dissent in Chandler v. Judicial 
Counci/, 26 Justice Black expressed his fear that the Supreme Court was 
allowing "the hope for an independent judiciary" to become "no more 
than an evanescent dream."27 Chandler involved an order issued by 
the Tenth Circuit Judicial Council that Judge Chandler, a federal dis-
trict judge, "take no action whatsoever in any case or proceeding now 
or hereafter pending"28 in his court because of his allegedly unaccept-
able performance. In a separate dissenting opinion, Justice Douglas, 
with whom Justice Black concurred, argued that "there is no power 
under our Constitution for one group of federal judges to censor or 
discipline any federal judge and no power to declare him inefficient 
and strip him of his power to act as a judge."29 The majority opinion 
in Chandler ducked the issues raised by Justice Douglas and Justice 
Black by declaring that the Court had no authority to consider the 
petitioner's claim because he had failed to make out a case for the 
extraordinary relief of mandamus or prohibition. 30 
The dissenting opinions in Chandler are important because they 
suggest, without apparent challenge from the Court's majority, that 
judicial independence protects a judge not only from external legisla-
24. See REPORT OF THE HOUSE CoMM. ON THE JUDICIARY To ACCOMPANY H. R.Es. 499, 
IMPEACHMENT OF JUDGE .ALCEE L. HAsTINGS, H.R. REP. No. 810, lOOth Cong., 2d Sess. 1-5 
(1988); Impeachment in the House, Wash. Post, Aug. 9, 1988, at A19, col. 1. 
Hastings was the first black to be appointed to the federal bench in Florida, and most media 
attention has been on Hastings' allegations that his prosecution was the result of racial discrimi-
nation by the Justice Department. See, e.g., The Perplexing Case of Judge Alcee Hastings, Wash. 
Post, July 7, 1988, at Cl, col. 1; 60 Minutes: Alcee Hastings (CBS television broadcast, Aug. 14, 
1988) (transcript available through 60 Minutes). 
25. See Hastings l 770 F.2d at 1093; Hastings v. Judicial Conference of the United States, 
829 F.2d 91 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert denied, 108 S. Ct. 1487 (1988) (''Hastings//''}. 
26. 398 U.S. 74, 141 (1970) (Black, J., dissenting). 
27. 398 U.S. at 143. 
28. 398 U.S. at 78. 
29. 398 U.S. at 137 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
30. 398 U.S. at 89. 
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tive and executive censors and sanctions, but also from regulation by 
colleagues on the bench. Under this view, an individual judge may not 
be regulated except through impeachment or criminal prosecution. 
This is a startling notion if it is true that there are serious acts of mis-
conduct that do not rise to the level of impeachable conduct. Indeed, 
even if one were to accept the proposition that any act of misconduct 
is subject to impeachment, the Blacl{/Douglas position is still quite 
extreme, because we know from history that Congress is loathe to in-
voke the impeachment process against federal judges. Thus, adoption 
of the view espoused by Justices Black and Douglas would mean that 
individual judges would be left to define "good behavior" in all cases 
not involving criminal or impeachable conduct. The problem with 
this approach is that it leaves untended a wide category of judicial 
misconduct and virtually all forms of judicial disability, save through 
self-regulation by individual judges. Nonetheless, the Black/Douglas 
position raises a compelling point that cannot be ignored. Individual 
judges must be afforded an enormous measure of independence to en-
sure that, in the words of John Marshall, each will have "nothing to 
influence or control him but God and his conscience."31 The dissent-
ing opinions in Chandler fortify this precept. 
With the idea of judicial independence as a goal, the Framers fash-
ioned constitutional devices to protect judges against the "will of [the] 
masses, or the will of the national legislature, [or] the will of the na-
tional executive."32 Because judges needed to be confident that they 
could decide each case before them without fear of reprisal, their ten-
ure had to be independent of any other opinion. But it does not neces-
sarily follow that individual judges must be left to determine for 
themselves the meaning of "good behavior" or be free from all but 
self-regulation to deal with serious misconduct and disability that does 
not rise to the level of impeachable action. It is at this juncture in the 
analysis that I part company with Justice Douglas and Justice Black. 
In considering the problem of judicial misconduct and disability, I 
start with the principles of judicial independence and separation of 
powers. In general terms, I reach the following conclusions: first, no 
judge may be removed from office except through impeachment; sec-
ond, Congress may define and execute the Constitution's impeachment 
provisions as it sees fit, and the other branches of government have no 
control over Congress in its exercise of this authority; and, third, for 
improper behavior that does not reach the high, "impeachable" 
31. Evans v. Gore, 253 U.S. 245, 250 (1919) (quoting John Marshall, cited at Debates, Va. 
Conv. 1829-1831, 616, 619). 
32. Otis, A Proposed Tribunal: Is It Constitutional?, 7 U. KAN. CITY L. REV. 3, 42 (1938). 
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threshold, the judiciary alone has the constitutional authority to regu-
late its own members. In my view, this interpretation of the Constitu-
tion is the only one faithful to the language of the document, to the 
ideals that prompted that language, and to the few cases that have 
addressed it. 
Although recent events (involving Judges Claiborne, Nixon, and 
Hastings) have focused attention on unfortunate instances of alleged 
judicial misconduct, I have no reason to doubt the integrity of the 
federal judiciary as a whole. Indeed, I believe that most of my col-
leagues would agree that corruption is atypical among federal 
judges.33 However, I am willing to accept that there may be a few 
dishonorable judges. I also believe that in order to maintain the high 
level of public confidence crucial for the judiciary's continued vital-
ity, 34 individual judges must maintain a standard of conduct that is, 
perhaps, less forgiving than that to which the average citizen is held. 35 
These dual beliefs in the integrity of the judiciary and in its uncompro-
mising ethical standard support my assertion that members of the fed-
eral bench are uniquely well-qualified to judge their peers fairly. 
It is with these ideas in mind that I view the Hastings case to be a 
truly significant one. After he was acquitted of criminal charges, 
Judge Hastings faced "charges" brought by his judicial colleagues pur-
suant to a congressional enactment allowing for the prosecution of in-
dividual judges before a Judicial Council for alleged acts of 
misconduct. 36 What is noteworthy about the Hastings case is not that 
his colleagues saw fit to proceed against him, but that they did so pur-
suant to a congressional statute that seeks to proscribe a wide range of 
33. See, e.g., the remarks of Justice John Paul Stevens at the Stetson University College of 
Law's 1983 Inns of Court Banquet: "I have no doubt that virtually all of [the 1,000 federal and 
more than 26,000 state judges] are rendering judicial service that is entitled to the highest re-
spect." Stevens, Reflections on the Removal of Sitting Judges, 13 STETSON L. REv. 215, 220 
(1984). See also Kaufman, Chilling Judicial Independence, 88 YALE L.J. 681, 682 (1979). 
34. See, e.g., THE FEDERALisr, supra note 1, No. 78, at 523 ("The judiciary ... has no 
influence over either the sword or the purse, no direction either of the strength or of the wealth of 
the society, and can take no active resolution whatever. It may truly be said to have neither 
Force nor Will, but merely judgment."). Cf. id. No. 65, at 441 ("[l]t is •.. to be doubted whether 
[the Supreme Court] would possess the degree of credit and authority, which might, on certain 
occasions, be indispensable, towards reconciling the people to a decision, that should happen to 
clash with an accusation brought by their i=ediate representatives."); J. GOULDEN, supra note 
8, at 11 (remarking at the fact that the judiciary is obeyed in controversial decisions even in the 
face of potentially violent resistance). 
35. See generally Lubet, Judicial Ethics and Private Lives, 79 Nw. U. L. REv. 983, 985-88 
(1985). 
36. See Judicial Councils Reform and Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980, Pub. L. 
No. 96-458, 94 Stat. 2035 (1980) (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 331, 332, 372, 604 (1982)); see also 
infra Part III. 
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judicial misconduct, and to endorse disciplinary sanctions short of 
impeachment. 
I think that the congressional enactment at issue in Hastings raises 
grave concerns because it cannot easily be squared with traditional 
notions of judicial independence and separation of powers. In its zeal 
for efficiency and moral purity in the judicial ranks, Congress may 
have indulged "a cavalier assumption that the independence of the ju-
diciary will not suffer significantly from 'minor' legislative encroach-
ments. " 37 But if a judge can be made to answer outside of the criminal 
and impeachment processes for judicially related activities, pursuant 
to a loosely constructed congressional act regulating judicial "miscon-
duct," one wonders about the sanctity of separation of powers and the 
inviolability of judicial independence. I do not think we can afford to 
shy away from this problem merely because it involves delicate and 
difficult questions of constitutional law. Too much is at stake. In the 
sections that follow, I will address this issue and offer what I view as a 
viable framework for dealing with judicial misconduct. 
II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARDS 
A. The Relationship Between "Good Behavior" 
and Impeachable Conduct 
As indicated in Part I, the Constitution contains three provisions 
related to judicial tenure: the impeachment clauses in articles !38 and 
II, 39 and the good behavior clause in article III. 40 Article I establishes 
that the impeachment power lies only with Congress; article II states 
that the President, Vice President, and all civil Officers of the United 
States may be removed from office on impeachment for, and convic-
tion of, treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors; and 
article III ensures that judges shall serve for life during good behavior. 
Although the ambiguity arising from these provisions has caused 
much debate about, for example, whether or not impeachment is the 
exclusive constitutional means for removing federal judges,41 several 
matters are beyond dispute. First, Congress, and only Congress, has 
the constitutional authority to execute the impeachment procedures, 
37. Hastings l 770 F.2d at 1105 (Edwards, J., concurring). 
38. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 5; art. I, § 3, cl. 6. 
39. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4. 
40. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
41. Compare Otis, supra note 32, at 13-16 (impeachment is the only constitutional way to 
remove judges) and Kurland, The Constitution and the Tenure of Federal Judges: Some Notes 
from History, 36 u. CHI. L. REV. 665 (1969) (same) w(th R. BERGER, IMPEACHMENT: THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS 122-80 (1973) (impeachment is not an exclusive remedy) and 
Shartel, Federal Judges - Appointment. Supervision, and Removal - Some Possibilities Under 
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including defining what amounts to a ''high crime[ ] and misde-
meanor[]." While the definition Congress sets for this term obviously 
impacts on the "good behavior" standard insofar as it sets the thresh-
old across which conduct is to be disciplined by Congress alone, this 
definition is not for the judiciary or anyone else to determine. The 
standard does not admit of easy definition, and scholarly attempts 
have been all but futile. Notwithstanding the difficult hypothetical 
scenarios generated by commentators, however, history has shown 
that Congress rarely if ever has been inclined to abuse its power in 
defining "high crimes and misdemeanors" or in acting to impeach. 
Second, it has never been disputed that judges were to be consid-
ered "civil officers" subject to impeachment under article II. This is 
perhaps because of the commentary published contemporaneously 
with the adoption of the Constitution: 
The precautions for [federal judges'] responsibility are comprised in the 
article respecting impeachments. They are liable to be impeached for 
mal-conduct by the house of representatives, and tried by the senate, and 
if convicted, [they] may be dismissed from office and disqualified from 
holding any other. This is the only provision on the point[ ] which is 
consistent with the necessary independence of the judicial character, and 
is the only one which we find in our own constitution in respect to our 
own judges.42 
The ambiguities of the Constitution nonetheless persist. For exam-
ple, it has been argued that, because there is a "hiatus" between im-
peachable behavior and conduct that does not satisfy the standard of 
"good behavior" enunciated in article III, there must be remedies 
other than impeachment for disciplining and removing federal 
judges. 43 In other words, there is the question of how to deal with 
"not good" behavior that is neither criminal nor impeachable. Fur-
thermore, the Constitution is unclear with respect to ·matters of crimi-
nal conduct. It has never been determined whether the reference to 
"treason, bribery, and other high crimes and misdemeanors" is in-
tended to cover all (and only) criminal conduct. Just as there is argua-
bly conduct that would be impeachable but not criminal, there may be 
conduct that is criminal but not impeachable. 
the Constitution, Part III: Judicial Removal of Unfit District and Circuit Judges, 28 MICH. L. 
REV. 870, 879 (1930) (same). 
For interesting discussions of judicial discipline and impeachment, see generally, Symposium 
on Judicial Discipline and Impeachment, 16 KY. L.J. 633 (1987-1988). 
42. THE FEDERALIST, supra note 1, No. 79, at 532-33 (A. Hamilton). From the time of the 
first Congress, it was assumed that judges were impeachable. During the debate on the Judiciary 
Act of 1789, Congressman Smith of South Carolina stated that "[t]he judges are to hold their 
commissions during good behavior, and after they are appointed they are removable only by 
impeachment .... " 1 ANNAIS OF CoNG. 797 (J. Gales ed. 1834). 
43. See Otis, supra note 32, at 32-33. 
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Thus, the Constitution suggests three theoretical categories of judi-
cial misbehavior - criminal, impeachable, and not good. Logically, 
all impeachable behavior is not good, and all criminal behavior is not 
good; but not all "not good" behavior is criminal, nor is it impeacha-
ble. The important question becomes: if there is a "hiatus" between 
impeachable behavior and other conduct that does not satisfy the stan-
dard of "good behavior" under article III, must the "not good" behav-
ior go unregulated? 
Examination of the debates at the Constitutional Convention does 
not offer much clarification. The Framers had originally used the 
term "maladministration" in place of the reference to "high crimes 
and misdemeanors." But "maladministration" was withdrawn by 
George Mason after Madison's objection that the term was so vague as 
to be virtually meaningless.44 Aside from this change - which, ironi-
cally, produced no real clarity in the definitions of either impeachable 
conduct or "good behavior" - the debates focused generally on how 
to best ensure an independent judiciary; in fact, judicial removal was of 
little concern to the Framers. The impeachment provisions, which af-
fect the President and Vice President as well as judges, were intended 
to act as a check primarily on executive rather than judicial activity.45 
It is hard to say definitively whether all judicial impeachments 
have been for indictable conduct, or whether "high crimes or misde-
meanors" has actually been interpreted to set a higher standard of 
conduct for judges than for citizens not holding public o~ce. Some 
impeachments have been for acts considered criminal no matter the 
actor, such as accepting bribes, treason (supporting the Secession), 
fraud or tax evasion,46 others for conduct which is criminal when a 
judge is the perpetrator, such as favoritism towards or maltreatment of 
litigants. 47 It has been argued that some judges have been impeached, 
and in some cases convicted, for conduct that would not have been 
grounds for indicting an average, non-office-holding citizen.48 Some 
44. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 at 550 (M. Farrand ed. 1911) 
[hereinafter M. FARRAND]. 
45. R. BERGER, supra note 41, at 146-47. 
46. Judge Claiborne was impeached for tax evasion, see Note, In Defense of the Constitution's 
Judicial Impeachment Standard, 86 MICH. L. REv. 420, 421 (1987); Judge Halsted Ritter for 
accepting kickbacks and for income tax evasion, see J. BORKIN, supra note 17, at 243-44. 
47. See, e.g., J. BORKIN, supra note 17, at 231-32 (Judge George English resigned before his 
impeachment on favoritism charges in 1925; Judge James Peck was acquitted on impeachment 
articles of mistreatment of counsel in 1830, id. at 240-41; Judge Harold Louderback was acquit-
ted by the Senate in 1932 of charges of favoritism in appointment of incompetent receivers and 
allowing them excessive fees, id. at 238). 
48. See ten Broek, Partisan Politics and Federal Judgeship Impeachments Since 1903, 23 
MINN. L. REv. 185 (1939). Ten Broek argues that Judges Ritter and Archbald were convicted of 
articles of impeachment that did not amount to indictable offenses. In 1936, Judge Ritter took a 
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scholars also contend that not all criminal conduct is impeachable. 
Ninth Circuit Judge J. Clifford Wallace, at a Senate Hearing on judi-
cial discipline, recently suggested that not all crimes are considered so 
serious that they should mandate automatic forfeiture of office.49 For 
example, destruction of a mailbox is a federal felony.so Similarly, 
adultery is a felony in some states.st Yet, it might be argued that these 
crimes are not of a magnitude to justify the disqualification of an 
otherwise competent judge. 
The foregoing comments may seem a bit tangential here, because 
of my original statement that the definition of "treason, bribery, and 
other high crimes and misdemeanors" is a matter solely for Con-
gress. s2 Yet, the potential existence of a "hiatus" between impeacha-
ble behavior and conduct that is not "good behavior" has broad 
analytical repercussions upon a finding of "not good" behavior. If to 
"hold office during good behavior" under article III simply means that 
a judge is guaranteed life tenure so long as he or she avoids the com-
mission of treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors, 
then the hiatus does not exist, and the constitutional equation is fairly 
easy. Good behavior, as a constitutional matter, will be, tautologi-
cally, any conduct that will not support impeachment. But if "good 
behavior" is not the complete converse of "high crimes and misde-
meanors," then a constitutional category of "not good" behavior must 
exist that is not subject to impeachment. If a judge cannot be im-
peached for this bad behavior, what kind of discipline may be used? 
Article Ill's "hold office" language could be read to instruct that a 
judge's continued tenure be contingent upon maintenance of "good" 
behavior. Syllogistically, a judge could be removed for bad behavior. 
Thus, one potential implication of the "hiatus" line of reasoning is that 
an alternative to impeachment must exist for removing a misbehaving 
$4500 fee from a former law partner which was nevertheless held not to be a bribe. Archbald 
had "corrupt alliances" with coal mine owners and railroad officials. New Hampshire District 
Judge John Pickering has also come to be seen as impeached and convicted for drunkenness and 
profanity on the bench, when in fact Congress wanted to oust a judge who had gone insane. See 
J. BORKIN, supra note 17, at 242-43; THE FEDERALIST No. 79, at 529 n.l (P. Ford ed. 1898) 
(editor's note). 
49. See Hearings on S.J. Res. 364 and S.J. Res. 370 Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution 
of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1986), quoted in Note, supra note 
46, at 451 n.175 (prepared statement of Judge J. Clifford Wallace). 
50. 18 u.s.c. § 1705 (1982). 
51. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 18-6601 (1987). 
52. But see Feerick, Impeaching Federal Judges: A Study of the Constitutional Provisions, 39 
FORDHAM L. R.Ev. 1, 57 (1970) (arguing that Congress does not retain the sole discretion to 
define impeachable offenses). 
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judge if Congress chooses not to impeach for mere bad behavior.53 
While there may be some merit in this version of the "hiatus" the-
ory, I nevertheless side with those who believe that impeachment is an 
exclusive means to remove federal judges. 54 Federal judges are guar-
anteed life tenure to protect their independence. The cumbersome im-
peachment mechanism is an important weapon against political winds. 
It protects the independence of federal judges as surely as does the 
guarantee of life tenure._ If an easier alternative were available for re-
moving federal judges, that independence would be threatened. 
This need for judicial independence has apparently conquered 
competing concerns over time. No judge ever has been removed from 
office save through the formal impeachment process. Significantly, 
most congressional attempts to expedite removal have assumed that a 
constitutional amendment would be necessary first. 55 This point is 
dramatized by the case of Judge Nixon, who has continued to draw his 
judicial salary while in prison; no one has suggested that there is any 
legal way to stop paying him unless he is impeached. 
Even the ambiguous constitutional text, with its two judicial ten-
ure clauses, can be read to be consistent with this conclusion.56 If the 
good behavior clause actually "amplifies" the impeachment clause, 
"[e]ach borrow[ing] cogency and light from the other,"57 then the 
good behavior language may have been inserted to differentiate the 
standard for impeachment of judges from the standard for other civil 
officers. No other subset of the impeachable "civil officers" class is 
mentioned anywhere in the Constitution, perhaps because the terms of 
other civil officers are not constitutionally set. "Hold office during 
good behavior" may simply reinforce that "other officers shall hold 
their offices during a limited time, or according to the will of some 
53. This "exclusivity of removal" question has long been debated in the literature. See supra 
note 41 and accompanying text. 
54. As I said in Hastings/, 770 F.2d at 1107 (Edwards, J., concurring). 
SS. See Kurland, supra note 41, at 697; Note, supra note 46, at 431. 
56. A more common structural argument derives from the maxim of statutory construction, 
expressio unius est exclusio alterius (the expression of one thing is the exclusion of another). It is 
significant that the Constitution mentions only impeachment when the Framers had a number of 
other removal procedures available to them from English precedent. See, e.g., Ziskind, Judicial 
Tenure in the American Constitution: English and American Precedents, 1969 SUP. Cr. RBv. 
135. One of these, by application of Congress to the Executive, was debated and rejected, M .. 
FARRAND, supra note 44, at 428-29, and others had fallen into a disuse that rendered them 
"fossil" rather than precedent. Ziskind, supra, at 138. The Convention also rejected trial of 
impeachment by the judiciary. See Feerick, supra note 52, at 15-23. This context supports the 
argument that, had alternative removal means been intended, they would have been menti~ned. 
57. W. BROWN, IMPEACHMENT - A MONOGRAPH OF THE IMPEACHMENT OF THE FED-
ERAL JUDICIARY 10 (1914) (published as S. Doc. No. 358, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. (1914)). 
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person."58 Thus, while acknowledging the existence of "bad behav-
ior," the "good behavior" clause gives Congress no additional removal 
power beyond impeachment. 
Of course, another line of reasoning doubts that this theoretical 
"hiatus" can actually exist in practice. In order to give rise to a "hia-
tus," "treason, bribery and high crimes and misdemeanors" must be 
interpreted literally to encompass a narrow class of bad acts; this ap-
proach reveals other bad acts that fall short of "treason, bribery and 
high crimes and misdemeanors," but for which some sort of sanction 
besides impeachment is appropriate. Examples of this could range 
from indecent personal habits inside or outside the courtroom, to sub-
standard judicial performance, to mental or physical incapacity. But 
if "high crimes and misdemeanors" is defined more broadly, to encom-
pass less grievous ethical infractions, then the gap between "not good" 
behavior and impeachable behavior disappears; they are merely two 
different ways of expressing the same type of conduct. Some scholars 
have embraced this alternative approach, 59 pointing to several judicial 
impeachments that arguably were based on this broader definition of 
high crimes. 60 They claim that, in fact, any "not good" behavior is 
impeachable, leaving a standard as expressed by then-Congressman 
Ford that "an impeachable offense is whatever a majority of the House 
of Representatives considers it to be at a given moment in history."61 
Yet, despite these arguments, it is generally fair to say that "judges 
cannot be removed for political reasons or mere misbehavior, but only 
for the 'gravest cause.' " 62 The undisputed fact that the Framers envi-
sioned impeachment for "malconduct" to be a limited exception to the 
permanent tenure of judges makes it almost inconceivable that they 
designed the impeachment provision to be anything but a narrow stop-
gap against very serious abuses. Modern Congresses, no doubt mindful 
that the impeachment power ensures the accountability of the judges 
as well as their independence, have always wielded the responsibility 
with caution: no one ever has been impeached for less than serious 
58. 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 482 (J. Gales ed. 1834) (remarks of Congressman Lawrence). 
Congressman Lawrence continued, "[I]f all persons are to hold their offices during good beha-
viour, and to be removed only by impeachment, then this particular declaration in favor of the 
judges will be useless." Id. 
59. See, e.g., Yankwich, Impeachment of Civil Officers Under the Federal Constitution, 26 
GEO. L.J. 849, 852-61 (1938). 
60. Cf. ten Broek, supra note 48, at 193 ("By [Judge Archbald's impeachment] conviction the 
Senate approved the doctrine that the constitutional provision that judges shall hold their offices 
'during good behavior' is attended with the corollary that they may be removed by impeachment 
for behavior which is not good."). 
61. 116 CONG. REC. 11913 (1970). 
62. Feerick, supra note 52, at 30. 
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malconduct. The cumbersome impeachment process itself has served 
to discourage its use for minor offenses. 63 Then-Congressman Ford's 
flippant statement asserts too much: in order to carry a majority of 
the House, any suggested standard for defining impeachable conduct 
must, as a political matter, find some support in the literal terms of the 
Constitution. Congress would not invoke the cumbersome impeach-
ment process on a whim, without some defensible standard against 
which to judge an accused officeholder. The process requires too 
much of Congress' scarce time, 64 thus ensuring that the House will be 
unlikely to pursue impeachment for less than very serious charges. 
History has thus left us with a rough consensus on two constitu-
tional conclusions: first, that a constitutional hiatus between "bad be-
havior" and impeachable "high crimes and misdemeanors" exists, 
and, second, that impeachment is the only removal mechanism for 
federal judges. Even if the hiatus is not constitutionally derived, and 
"bad behavior" was int~nded to be coextensive with "high crimes and 
misdemeanors," there will nonetheless always remain a category of po-
tential judicial misconduct for which Congress, as a practical matter, 
will not impeach. With this said, the problem reemerges: If a judge 
may not be removed for anything short of impeachable conduct, and 
only Congress may impeach, the bad behavior that does not alarm 
Congress must be dealt with through an alternative method. Of 
course, some truly exceptional misconduct draws adverse publicity, 
and a judge may be shamed into resigning before impeachment is even 
considered. Thus, in today's electronic age, the media itself can per-
form limited triage on miscreant judges. 65 However, the truly difficult 
question is what other official remedies exist, and who may execute 
them. 
B. Self-Regulation and Separation of Powers 
Let me make clear just what I mean by behavior or disability that 
is arguably unimpeachable but not "good." As with everything else in 
the law, there are easy cases and hard cases. The easy cases are imme-
diately quantifiable and call into question the judge's impartiality, de-
63. See Shenon, Impeachment of Judges: A "Cumbersome Tool." N.Y. Times, Apr. 2, 1986, 
at A16, col. 3; Nunn, Judicial Tenure, 54 CH1.-KENT L. REV. 29, 30 (1977) (impeachments take 
weeks of House and Senate time). 
64. See Note, supra note 46, at 447. 
65. I do not want to make too much of this point. I recognize that the impact of the media on 
public officials is a matter of some controversy. I only assert that a number of judges have been 
"publicized" out of office since the press became a potent force in American life. See, e.g., J, 
BORKIN, supra note 17, at 204; Battisti, An Independent Judiciary or an Evanescent Dream, 25 
CASE W. REs. L. REv. 711, 743 (1975). 
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pendability, or capacity to conduct official business. Examples might 
include harassment or abuse of counsel or litigants in the courtroom; 
blatant case mismanagement; inability or unwillingness to handle a 
reasonable caseload; inadequate or sloppy work product due to lack of 
intelligence or effort; or a public political endorsement. The cases be-
come more difficult to assess, either as "misconduct" or "disability," 
when the conduct or incapacity does not consistently and directly af-
fect judicial business. Examples might include alcoholism; infirmity 
due to age or illness; offensive behavior towards colleagues; breach of 
confidentiality, such as leaking information to the press or political 
allies; or even offensive personal behavior such as aberrant sexual con-
duct off the bench that comes into the public spotlight. 
In this broad category of unimpeachable conduct and disability, 
especially with respect to the so-called "easy cases," I would submit 
that the ideal of judicial independence is not compromised when 
judges are monitored and even regulated by their peers. The principal 
limit to any system of judicial self-regulation is that it may not include 
any form of removal from office. This means that individual judges 
may not be sanctioned by their peers through discharge, imprison-
ment, 66 or salary reduction. 67 An argument also can be made that an 
individual judge may not have her judicial docket suspended by col-
leagues, for this, too, would amount to a form ofremoval from office. 68 
But this argument sweeps too broadly because it would prevent a 
court from shifting case assignments to deal with situations in which a 
judge is either unable or unwilling to keep up with a reasonable 
caseload. Indeed, I believe that most members of the judiciary would 
readily agree that a court may temporarily remove a judge from the 
docket to allow or require him to catch up in his work. 
Obviously, any system of peer control will produce some question-
able cases. Nonetheless, as a general proposition, judicial self-regula-
tion is the logical constitutional remedy for compelling "good 
behavior," and it offers the best commonsense approach to maintain-
66. See Catz, Removal of Federal Judges by Imprisonment, 18 RUTGERS L.J. 103, 115-16 
(1986); Note, supra note 46, at 425, 457. But see Burbank, Alternative Career Resolution: An 
Essay on the Removal of Federal Judges, 76 KY. L.J. 643, 671-72 & n.130 (1987-1988) (the 
Framers meant only "the formal termination of a commission or of tenure in office" when they 
wrote "removal from office" in art. I, § 3, cl. 7). 
67. Cf Hastings], 770 F.2d at 1110-11 (Edwards, J., concurring) (to interpret the Act to 
preclude government payment of defendant judges' legal fees effectively diminishes judicial sala-
ries); Hastings[], 829 F.2d at 103 (same). 
68. See Note, Unnecessary and Improper: The Judicial Councils Reform and Judicial Con-
duct and Disability Act o/ 1980, 94 YALE L.J. 1117, 1131-33 (1985); Chandler v. Judicial Coun-
cil, 398 U.S. 74, 84 (1970) (there is a "line defining the maximum permissible [discipline] 
intervention consistent with the constitutional requirement of judicial independence"). 
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ing both judicial independence and judicial accountability. Constitu-
tionally, self-regulation is compelled by separation of powers concerns, 
which, as I shall explain, require that the judiciary alone be responsi-
ble for regulating its own conduct short of impeachment and that 
neither Congress nor the Executive may meddle in the definition or 
regulation of behavior that is not otherwise impeachable conduct. It is 
of no real consequence whether we label unimpeachable bad behavior 
a "constitutional" category derived from the hiatus theory, or a practi-
cal manifestation of the fact that Congress will not, realistically, im-
peach a judge for every ethical infraction. The category and my 
analysis remain the same. 
Pragmatically, self-regulation can work because judges are 
uniquely well-equipped to be fair in assessing claims of misconduct 
and disability. Though some have questioned whether any member of 
the judiciary could remain impartial when judging another judge be-
cause of the miscreant's "tarnishing effect" on the judiciary as an insti-
tution, 69 these commentators overlook a judge's ability to recuse 
himself from cases in which he70 or a litigant71 feels that the judge may 
not be able to maintain impartiality. More importantly, judges must 
put remote personal involvements behind them daily and decide cases 
on their merits rather than on personal bias. Just as most judges can 
separate issues of fact from issues of law, they also can winnow out 
issues of personal predilection from those of law and fact. They will 
easily be able to refer impeachable offenses to Congress and to deal 
internally with less serious ones. 
Not only is it the job of judges to be fair, they cannot afford to be 
cavalier in their execution of any system of self-regulation. In Chan-
dler, Justice Douglas argued that we should never allow "federal 
judges to ride herd on other federal judges. This is a form of 'hazing' 
having no place under the Constitution."72 His point was that the 
"idiosyncrasies" of individual judges "may be displeasing to those who 
walk in more measured, conservative steps[,] [b]ut those idiosyncrasies 
can be of no possible constitutional concern to other federal judges. "73 
This is a powerful point and, in my experience on the bench, I have 
found that the force of the point made by Justice Douglas has never 
been lost on me or my colleagues. Every judge must live by the same 
69. See Note, supra note 46, at 453 ("there is arguably no judge in the federal system who 
could adjudicate another judge's trial without struggling with objectivity"). 
70. See 28 U.S.C. § 455 (1988). 
71. See 28 U.S.C. § 144 (1988). 
72. Chandler. 398 U.S. at 140 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
73. 398 U.S. at 141 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
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standard. Judges cherish the principle of judicial independence. 
Every judge understands that judicial independence would be lost if 
individual judges were allowed to be dominated by the group. If one 
individual must forfeit her or his independence, a precedent is estab-
lished that will threaten every member of the group. Judges will not 
tolerate this; thus, no member of the group is likely to discipline an-
other without great caution. 
It could be suggested that this empathy between judges will make 
them act too quickly on behalf of the accused. This is not an insignifi-
cant concern, but I believe that this "bonding" instinct will be tem-
pered by two factors. First, there will be an equal and opposite natural 
impetus by judges to be harsh with their peers because the misbehavior 
of one federal judge arguably has a ripple effect on the reputation of 
the judiciary as a whole. In a branch that depends heavily on public 
respect for its continued vitality, the image of a crooked judge can 
jeopardize the entire group. Second, in part due to this interdepend-
ence of reputations, judges will be reluctant to appear to be bestowing 
preferential treatment upon a misbehaving colleague. 74 Overall, 
judges' naturally empathetic and disapproving impulses will blunt 
each other, leaving them as the best people, from a practical stand-
point, to carry out the judicial policing function. 
This theory of judicial self-regulation derives from the constitu-
tional language that gives rise to the separation of powers doctrine. 
The Constitution says nothing about separation of powers per se; it 
speaks only of the assignment of powers. Article I, section 1 of the 
Constitution provides that "[a]ll legislative Powers herein granted 
shall be vested in a Congress of the United States"; article II, section 1 
vests "[t]he executive Power ... in a President of the United States of 
America"; and article Ill, section 1 vests "[t]he judicial power of the 
United States ... in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as 
the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish." Yet, this 
simple assignment is the basis for the important constitutional doc-
trine of separation of powers. The Framers were aware that a well-
functioning democracy required distinct governmental departments. 
No fewer than four of The Federalist papers defended the principle.75 
James Madison went so far as to state that "[n]o political truth is cer-
tainly of greater intrinsic value or is stamped with the authority of 
more enlightened patrons of liberty" than the separation of powers. 76 
74. See United States v. Claiborne, 781 F.2d 1327, 1331-32 (9th Cir. 1986) (Reinhardt, J., 
dissenting from denial of hearing en bane). 
75. See THE FEDERALIST Nos. 47, 48, 49, and 51. 
76. THE FEDERALIST, supra note 1, No. 47, at 324. 
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But the Framers also realized that separating powers did not necessi-
tate isolating the branches of government. In fact, a democracy could 
not be sustained without interactive branches for common support and 
common restraint. The Federalist No. 48 explained that separating 
powers between the departments of government meant only "that the 
powers properly belonging to one of the departments[ ] ought not to 
be directly and compleatly administered by either of the other depart-
ments, "77 not that the branches had no power to check the actions of 
each other. 
Thus, the Framers chose to assign powers, instead of ordaining 
"separateness," so as to maintain a careful balance between intrusion 
and isolation. Separation of powers does not mean that there is no 
constitutional interplay among the departments of government. It 
means, precisely, that one branch should not perform another's func-
tion. One branch's interference may occasionally be valuable to help 
another branch perform its own function. In fact, the Constitution 
mandates certain areas of interbranch oversight. Congress has some 
authority to ensure the efficient operation of the judiciary through the 
Necessary and Proper Clause,78 as well as explicit authority to "ordain 
and establish" courts inferior to the Supreme Court, 79 and to make 
"[e]xceptions" and "[r]egulations" limiting the Supreme Court's ap-
pellate jurisdiction. so And, of course, the Constitution gives Congress 
the sole power of judicial removal through the impeachment clauses.81 
But there is nothing in the Constitution that authorizes Congress to 
meddle in the substance of judicial business. 
It might be contended that defining "good behavior" and disciplin-
ing judges for bad behavior involves something other than the substan-
tive business of the courts. This position should be rejected on two 
grounds. First, the Constitution indicates only that Congress regulates 
judicial misconduct that involves the impeachment process and re-
moval for impeachable offenses. There is no other constitutional au-
thority justifying further congressional involvement in the regulation 
of good and bad behavior by members of the judiciary. Second, disci-
pline short of removal from office directs how a judge will perform his 
or her job. We allow each branch to monitor infractions within its 
ranks to the extent that it can because the fundamental nature of its 
duties can be protected only by its own responsibility for day-to-day 
77. Id. No. 48, at 332 (J. Madison). 
78. U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. 
79. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
80. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2. 
81. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. S; art. I, § 3, cl. 6. 
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oversight functions. 82 However, if one branch meddles often in the 
daily functions of another, the boundaries between the two branches' 
substantive duties will be obscured. The Constitution's grant of im-
peachment power to Congress does not "trickle down" to reach and 
prevent other, nonimpeachable, conduct. 
Precedent supports this functional analysis of the separation of 
powers doctrine. In INS v. Chadha, 83 the Supreme Court, speaking of 
the one-House legislative veto, noted that in order to preserve the 
checks on each branch of government and thus "mailltain the separa-
tion of powers, the carefully defined limits on the power of each 
Branch must not be eroded."84 Chadha teaches that only interbranch 
encroachments that exceed "functionally identifiable"85 powers violate 
separation of powers. While not finding the one-House veto to be a 
judicial act, the Court acknowledged that if Congress did perform an 
act the substance of which was judicial in character, it would overstep 
its constitutional bounds. 86 
In the recent decision upholding the special prosecutor law, the 
Court again stressed a functional approach to the duties of the differ-
ent governmental branches in analyzing whether the separation of 
powers doctrine had been violated. 87 Although finding that as a fac-
tual matter the statute providing for appointment of an independent 
counsel did not instruct or cause the legislative and judicial branches 
to overstep their constitutional boundaries, the Court's analysis turned 
on whether the Act "impermissibly interfer[ ed] with the functions of 
the Executive Branch."88 
As these cases suggest, the separation of powers doctrine is recip-
rocal in its application, insofar as it seeks to protect each branch of 
government to allow it to be functionally effective in the exercise of its 
assigned authority. Thus, the judiciary has regularly refused to inter-
fere with the daily operations of the other branches when presented 
82. Some have argued that judges may be "disciplined" solely through impeachment. The 
ultimate position of Senator Mathias is that "impeachment is not only the sole constitutional 
means of removing miscreant judges, it is the sole constitutionally permissible means of disciplin-
ing federal judges." Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Adminis-
tration of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 154 (1980), 
quoted in Burbank, Procedural Rulemaking Under the Judicial Councils Reform and Judicial 
Conduct and Disability Act of 1980, 131 U. PA. L. R.Ev. 283, 295 n.42 (1982). I disagree. The 
Constitution does not give any indication that impeachment is the sole means to discipline 
judges. It only indicates that impeachment is the sole way to remove them. 
83. 462 U.S. 919 (1983). 
84. 462 U.S. at 958. 
85. 462 U.S. at 951. 
86. 462 U.S. at 957 n.22. 
87. Morrison v. Olson, 108 S. Ct. 2597 (1988). 
88. 108 S. Ct. at 2622. 
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with the opportunity to do so. For example, lower federal courts have 
declined to decide cases that involved internal congressional affairs 
even though jurisdiction for judicial action might otherwise be found: 
Prudential considerations present in ... suits [involving internal congres-
sional affairs] prompt[ ] judicial restraint in the exercise of the federal 
court's remedial powers under Article III. Congressional actions pose a 
real danger of misuse of the courts by members of Congress whose actual 
dispute is with their fellow legislators. We are reluctant to meddle in the 
internal affairs of the legislative branch, and the doctrine of remedial 
discretion properly permits -us to consider the prudential, separation-of-
powers concerns posed by a suit for declaratory relief against the com-
plainant's colleagues in Congress. s9 
This theory has been approved in such disparate matters as House 
Committee appointments procedures,90 the constitutionality of new 
legislation when challenged by members of Congress who voted 
against it,91 and most recently in a challenge to the seating in the 
House of the winner of a recount election.92 
Even the Supreme Court has addressed the issue. In Roudebush v. 
Hartke, 93 the Court settled a limited question regarding the state of 
Indiana's power to prescribe the time, place, and manner of elections. 
The Court was careful to note, however, that it was "without power to 
alter the Senate's judgment" about seating its own members.94 On this 
point, the Court noted that the determination as to "[w]hich candidate 
is entitled to be seated in the [United States] Senate is, to be sure, a 
nonjusticiable political question - a question that would not have 
been the business of this Court even before the Senate acted."95 Gen-
erally, it has been assumed that the Court will not examine the inter-
nal workings of the legislature except when an individual is or may be 
denied a constitutional right, most often a due process or first amend-
ment right.96 Otherwise, attention to separation of powers concerns, 
as manifested by the political question or remedial discretion doc-
89. Moore v. United States House of Representatives, 733 F.2d 946, 956 (D.C. Cir. 1984), 
cert denied, 469 U.S. 1106 (1985). 
90. Vander Jagt v. O'Neill, 699 F.2d 1166 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 823 (1983), 
91. See, e.g., Moore, 733 F.2d 946; Crockett v. Reagan, 720 F.2d 1355 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. 
denied, 461 U.S. 1251 (1984); Riegle v. Federal Open Mkt. Comm., 656 F.2d 873 (D.C. Cir.), 
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1082 (1981). 
92. Morgan v. United States, 801 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 911 
(1987). 
93. 405 U.S. 15 (1972). 
94. 405 U.S. at 18-19 (citing Reed v. County Commrs., 277 U.S. 376 (1928)). 
95. 405 U.S. at 19 (citing Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969)). 
96. See Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969) (compelling Congress to judge the "qual-
ifications of its members" under article I, section 5 in a way that is true to the text of the 
Constitution). 
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trines, ensures that the judiciary will not instruct Congress on how to 
keep its own house in order. 
In my view, "[r]eciprocal respect for the courts suggests that Con-
gress should, and arguably must, be equally reluctant to impose its 
preferences on the judiciary's governance of its internal affairs."97 
This reading of the separation of powers doctrine commands that 
Congress has no role to play in the handling of judjcial misconduct 
that falls short of impeachable conduct. 
At one time I was inclined to think that "the constitutional guar-
antee of an independent judiciary [was] ... intended to secure the 
independence of individual judges as well as of the judiciary as an en-
tity . .. [and that] [i]f independent decisionmaking is to be protected, 
then, individual judges must be shielded from coercion."98 However, 
upon reconsideration of the necessary implications of the good behav-
ior clause, specifically in conjunction with separation of powers con-
cerns as I have delineated them, I now believe that individual judges 
are subject to some measure of control by their peei;s with respect to 
behavior or infirmity that adversely affects the work of the court and 
that does not rise to the level of impeachable conduct. I do not en-
tirely reject the Black/Douglas position in Chandler,99 for I believe 
that judicial independence must include significant independence for 
individual judges as a protection against what Justice Douglas calls 
"hazing"100 by the peer group. But if "good behavior" is to have any 
real content and if we are to ensure that the judiciary remains in-
dependent from other branches of government, then judges alone must 
regulate individual cases of bad behavior and disability that do not 
amount to impeachable action. This limited system of judicial self-
regulation raises no constitutional dilemma as long as removal power 
remains with Congress alone. 
C. Postscript on the Constitutional Issues 
The foregoing analysis admits of a minor complication if one does 
not accept the hiatus theory. Under my principal approach, I assert 
that the Constitution creates a hiatus of "bad behavior," i.e., conduct 
that is neither "good behavior" under article III nor impeachable con-
duct under article II. I argue that the judiciary alone should monitor 
this bad behavior through a system of self-regulation. In response to 
97. Hastings/, 770 F.2d at 1108 (Edwards, J., concurring). 
98. Hastings/, 770 F.2d at 1106, 1107 (Edwards, J., concurring) (emphasis in original). 
99. Chandler v. Judicial Council, 398 U.S. 74, 129-43 (1970). 
100. Chandler, 398 U.S. at 140 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
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those who reject the hiatus theory, I offer an alternative theory. Under 
the alternative approach I assert that, even if one were to accept the 
untenable position that all conduct that is not "good behavior" is im-
peachable, there would still be a de facto gap of bad behavior, because 
we know that Congress will not act to impeach in every case of misbe-
havior. I argue that judicial self-regulation should also be used to deal 
with this de facto category of bad behavior. 
Under my principal approach, a question might be raised with re-
spect to impeachable conduct that does not result in any congressional 
action. In other words, the House may elect not to proceed against a 
judge who is guilty of an impeachable offense, or the Senate may fail to 
convict. The question is whether there is any place for judicial self-
regulation with respect to impeachable conduct that does not result in 
impeachment. Obviously, such behavior will be a matter of great con-
cern to the judiciary. Nonetheless, consistent with my view of the re-
ciprocal aspects of separation of powers, I maintain that it is for 
Congress, not the judiciary, to deal with impeachable offenses. The 
judiciary may, of course, refer such matters to Congress for action, but 
congressional inaction will not justify judicial self-regulation. 
A somewhat perplexing analytical problem arises, however, under 
the alternative approach, which assumes that any conduct not satisfy-
ing the constitutional standard of "good behavior" is impeachable 
conduct. Separation of powers theory might suggest that the judiciary 
cannot regulate such behavior because it is within the exclusive prov-
ince of congressional authority. But this would leave wholly unat-
tended the de facto category of bad behavior. Analytically, the only 
reasonable way to deal with this problem is to assume that, even if 
Congress may elect to impeach with respect to any conduct that is not 
"good behavior," no separation of powers concerns arise if Congress 
declines to act. In other words, if Congress does not act to impeach, 
then there can be no conflict between the branches and the de facto 
category of bad behavior should be subject to judicial self-regulation. 
Both the principal and alternative approaches produce defensible 
results, although the former approach makes more sense in analytical 
terms. History has shown that Congress tends to define impeachable 
conduct narrowly, so the judiciary will rarely encroach on territory 
that is constitutionally reserved for congressional regulation. The 
greatest concern that we face is the hiatus (or de facto gap) of judicial 
misconduct that will remain unattended in the absence of judicial self-
regulation. The principal approach deals with this concern in a man-
ner that is consistent with the language of the Constitution and that 
averts any analytical confusion. 
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III. THE STATUTORY DIRECTIVE VERSUS THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARD 
787 
Given that, as a constitutional matter, Congress should stay out of 
the business of regulating judicial conduct that does not amount to 
impeachable behavior, it is difficult to comprehend the congressional 
enactment embodied in the Judicial Councils Reform and Judicial 
Conduct and Disability Act of 1980.101 The Act purports to "create a 
mechanism and procedures within the judicial branch of government 
to consider and respond to complaints against Federal judges."102 
Section 372(c) of the Act describes procedures for investigation and 
correction of judicial behavior, 103 and section 332 provides the circuit 
Judicial Councils with general authority to issue orders "necessary 
and appropriate ... for the effective and expeditious administration of 
justice within its circuit."104 
The Act's purported "delegation" of power to the judiciary is seri-
ously misguided for several reasons. There are at least two provisions 
in the Act that are questionable because they raise serious concerns 
regarding unlawful delegations of impeachment/removal power to the 
judiciary: one is the provision that instructs the judiciary to make rec-
ommendations to Congress about the impeachment of a judge; 105 the 
other is the provision that purports to authorize a Judicial Council 
effectively to. "suspend" a judge from further work by removing his 
case docket. 106 Both of these provisions have been severely criticized 
by some scholars, 107 but they do not go to the heart of my concern 
with the Act. In my view, the most significant flaw in the Act is Con-
gress' attempt to "delegate" power it never had. 
Of course, Congress' attempt to "authorize" judges to utilize their 
inherent power to self-regulate is well intentioned. As stated in the 
Senate Report on the Act, "[i]ust as the legislative and executive 
branches have the means to discipline their respective officials, it is 
101. Pub. L. No. 96-458, 94 Stat. 2035 (1980) (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 331, 332, 372, 604 
(1982 & Supp. IV 1986)). 
102. H.R. REP. No. 1313, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1980). 
103. 28 U.S.C. § 372(c) (1982). 
104. 28 u.s.c. § 332(d)(l) (1982). 
105. 28 U.S.C. § 372(c)(8) (1982). 
106. 28 U.S.C. § 372(c)(6)(B)(iv) (1982) (a Judicial Council may order "that, on a temporary 
basis for a time certain, no further cases be assigned to any judge ... whose conduct is the subject 
of a complaint"). 
107. See, e.g., Catz, supra note 66; Comment, Judicial Misconduct and Politics in the Federal 
System: A Proposal for Revising the Judicial Councils Act, 74 CALIF. L. REv. 1071 (1987); Note, 
supra note 68. But see Hastings II, 829 F.2d at 101-03 (no constitutional defect in allowing the 
Judicial Conference to determine that impeachment may be warranted and to certify such deter-
mination to the House of Representatives). 
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imperative that the judiciary implement its own disciplinary proce-
dure." 10s Yet, the judiciary already could, and did, implement this 
power- albeit informally-before 1980. Thus, the Act could be no 
more than a redundant affirmation of constitutionally mandated juris-
diction. But to the extent that the Act "delegates" powers Congress 
never had, it endangers constitutional doctrine by making the judici-
ary's continued jurisdiction in this area dependent on Congress' con-
tinued consent. 
This idea was expressed well in Myers v. United States, 109 a case 
that has been narrowed considerably by subsequent decisions110 but 
that is still good law on this point. In Myers, the Supreme Court held 
that, in its attempt to make the President's constitutionally granted 
removal power dependent upon the Senate's consent to his decisions, a 
statute granting the President appointment and removal power over 
postmasters with the advice and consent of the Senate was unconstitu-
tional. After concluding that the Senate's responsibility to advise and 
consent to the appointment of executive officers111 did not extend a 
corollary right to remove them, the Court reasoned that since the re-
moval power over postmasters already lay with the President, Con-
gress' grant of this right falsely implied that Congress could 
legislatively withdraw it. 112 Becaus~ Congress could not eliminate a 
constitutionally derived privilege through mere legislation, the statute 
was unconstitutional. 
Applying the foregoing principles, the 1980 Act is arguably twice 
flawed: first, Congress cannot delegate broad judicial oversight powers 
it never had; second, under Myers, this attempted delegation creates 
the false impression that Congress could, by withdrawing its assent to 
the grant of the right, also withdraw the right itself. 
Admittedly, the Act tries to accommodate separation of powers 
concerns in one way: rather than detailing the exact procedures the 
Judicial Councils must follow when investigating allegations against a 
judge, section 372(c)(l 1) directs that the Councils "may prescribe such 
rules for the conduct of proceedings . . . including the processing of 
petitions for review, as each considers to be appropriate."113 This ac-
commodation does not cure the facial constitutional problem, how-
108. S. REP. No. 362, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 5, 7, reprinted in 1979 U.S. CODE CONG. & 
ADMIN. NEWS 4315, 4321. 
109. 272 U.S. 52 (1926). 
110. See Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935); Weiner v. United 
States, 357 U.S. 349 (1958). 
111. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
112. Myers, 272 U.S. at 119-25. 
113. 28 U.S.C. § 372(c)(ll) (1982). 
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ever, because the Act otherwise purports to require the judiciary to 
follow intricate procedures in many areas, including written com-
plaints and decisions, 114 nearly absolute confidentiality, 115 and no judi-
cial review,116 as well as setting specific lines of authority and review. 
The Act reinforces my belief that each branch should self-regulate: 
each branch knows best its own problems and how to correct them. 
There are a myriad of concrete difficulties with the Act that go beyond 
its unconstitutionality and reflect the legislature's naivete about judi-
cial problems. Most importantly, the Act institutes formal procedures 
intended to promote and expedite legitimate complaints against errant 
judges. In theory, formality will encourage complainants, by assuring 
them that their petitions will be considered seriously. However, in re-
ality, the formality only encourages disappointed litigants to make un-
focused, nonlegally grounded charges. 
In late 1987, each circuit was asked to submit a report to the 
United States Judicial Conference on its experiences under the 1980 
Act since its inception. These reports show that most complaints 
come from litigants who have, lost cases before the accused judge. 
Most complaints are dismissed as patently frivolous, or as falling 
outside the jurisdictional scope of the Act. The Act thus has increased 
the number of frivolous complaints of judicial misconduct, increasing 
the workload of the Chief Judge and support staff accordingly. But it 
does not appear that the Act has resulted in the processing of charges 
that would have escaped scrutiny in the past. On this point, Chief 
Judge Wald of the D.C. Circuit observed that the Act "has not yet 
proven its worth as a vehicle for unearthing real judicial misconduct"; 
the experience of the D.C. Circuit in responding to complaints "has 
almost universally been with disappointed litigants or national 
organizations." 117 
Chief Judge Wald acknowledges that the Act "may well constitute 
an important safety valve for such complainants,"118 but this function 
simply is not a goal of the Act. In fact, this "safety valve" function 
may be antagonistic to one of the stated goals of the Act, that of pro-
114. 28 U.S.C. § 372(c)(l), 372(c)(4)(C), 372(c)(6)(C) (1982). 
llS. 28 U.S.C. § 372(c)(14) (1982). 
116. 28 U.S.C. § 372(c)(10) (1982). 
117. P. Wald, Report on Experience Under Judicial Conduct and Disability Act 9 (Sept. 25, 
1987) (unpublished Memorandum of Chief Judge, United States Court of Appeals District of 
Columbia Circuit, to Judge Elmo Hunter, Chairman, Court Administration Committee of the 
Judicial Conference of the United States, on file with the Michigan Law Review) [hereinafter 
D.C. Circuit Report]. 
118. Id. 
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moting judicial efficiency and expediency, 119 because of the large num-
bers of frivolous charges that now must be formally 'entertained. In 
the D.C. Circuit, for example, 26 of the 28 cases filed between 1981 
and 1987 were dismissed as frivolous at the outset by the Chief Judge. 
The two cases she did not dismiss were subsequently terminated at the 
next stage of investigation without resulting in any formal charges. 
Yet, as Judge Wald describes it, the 26 frivolous cases required consid-
erable work by the Chief Judge: 
Because . . . the vast number of . . . complaints in this Circuit as else-
where have been meritless, their disposition does add an average of sev-
eral hours per month to the Chief Judge's workload. . . . [I]n order to 
evaluate the claim it is usually necessary to call for and go through ex-
tensive portions of the record of the court proceedings out of which the 
vast majority of complaints emerge. The confidentiality requirements of 
the Act demand that the number of courthouse personnel who know of 
the filing of such a complaint be kept to an absolute minimum .... It is 
not altogether clear whether the Chief Judge may use a law clerk to 
research the record for purposes of reporting to the Chief Judge exactly 
where and what the relevant portions may be. Since most frequently the 
perennial litigators are also the perempal complainants, these records 
can be sizeable indeed and encompass proceedings over many years, with 
numerous appeals from motions, etc. It might bear consideration to per-
mit a Chief Judge, who is now solely responsible for the gatekeeping 
function on frivolous complaints, to be able to delegate that responsibil-
ity to other judges on occasion, and to make it clear that (s)he .can use 
staff to aid in the mechanics of the process.120 
Ironically, the busiest Judge on each circuit is the only person the 
Act appears to permit to handle even the most trivial tasks associated 
with its process, especially when considering that the figures from 
other Circuits show that the ratio of complaints immediately dis-
missed by the Chief Judge to total complaints mirrors those of the 
D.C. Circuit. Frivolous complaints make up between 88% and 99.5% 
of the total complaints filed in each Circuit.121 Complainant attributes 
underscore the needless waste of time associated with the processing of 
complaints. In the First Circuit, for example, over 30% of the 81 
complaints that were processed in the six-year period from 1981-1987 
119. See 1979 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS, supra note 108, at 4315. 
120. D.C. Circuit Report, supra note 117, at 3-4. But see Rieger, The Judicial Councils Re-
form and Judicial Conduct and Disability Act: Will Judges Judge Judges?, 37 EMORY L.J. 45 
(1988) (arguing that the judiciary's own mishandling of the charges leads to the large number 
labelled "frivolous"). 
121. See Reports of the Circuit Courts of Appeals on the Experience Under the Judicial 
Conduct Act for the Years 1981-1987, submitted to Judge Elmo Hunter, Chairman, Court Ad-
ministrative Committee of the Judicial Conference of the United States. These calculations as-
sume that each complaint not investigated was frivolous. The data vary mainly by the size of the 
Circuit - the larger the Circuit, the more complaints filed. 
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were filed by the same person.122 
Judge Wald's description also embodies what I call the restrictive 
effect of the Act. The Chief Judge of the D.C. Circuit justly feels 
bound to follow the most stringent possible interpretation of the confi-
dentiality portion of the Act, even at the expense of efficiency. This is 
one of the harmful practical consequences of the Act's improperly fo-
cused strictures. Even an Act that purports to do nothing more than 
institutionalize judicial self-regulation may induce the judiciary to fol-
low the letter of the statute. Congress' affirmation of the judiciary's 
inherent self-regulatory role may in fact stifle the old informal ways of 
discipline, notwithstanding some scholarship to the contrary.123 In-
deed, the Act may encourage the judiciary to ignore cases that fall 
between the cracks of the statute, but that would have been addressed 
before the Act was passed. It does not matter that the Act neither 
explicitly preempts the area, nor instructs the judiciary to act as if the 
statute occupied the field. The .effect is the same as if it did. For in-
stance, in another example suggested by Judge Wald, the D.C. Circuit 
did not know how to handle a case in which a formal complaint was 
never filed, but an allegation was made by a reputable source that a 
judge may have "committed some impropriety worthy of considera-
tion." 124 Judge Wald asks, "Should the court ignore [such an allega-
tion] until a formal complaint is filed? Is it appropriate for the court 
to contact the possible complainant to see if he/she wishes to file a 
complaint? Can an investigating committee be appointed sua sponte to 
see if there is fire, not just smoke?"125 I suggest that in cases such as 
these, the Act actually restricts the judicial policing function, contrary 
to its intent, because of judges' impulses to follow it literally. Before 
the Act set formal procedures, informal internal means could have en-
abled the Chief Judge to consider such charges as appropriate. Now, 
doing so could be seen as violating the statute. 
Oddly enough, the Act may thus function as somewhat of a "se-
curity blanket" under which a circuit can justify its disregard of a 
122. D. Gallup, First Circuit Report on the Operation of Local Judicial Discipline Rules 
Implementing the Judicial Conduct and Disability Act 1-2 (Sept. 16, 1987) (unpublished report 
of First Circuit Executive to Judge Elmo Hunter, Chairman, Court Administration Committee 
of the Judicial Conference of the United States, on file with the Michigan Law Review). 
123. See Burbank, Politics and Progress in Implementing the Federal Judicial Discipline Act, 
71 JUDICATURE 13 (1987); Fitzpatrick, Misconduct and Disability of Federal Judges: The Unre-
ported Informal Responses, 71 JUDICATURE 282 (1988). Even those who assert that the Act has 
reinforced rather than preempted the informal methods of disciplining judges admit that the 
press has played an enormous role in prompting disciplinary measures - an admission that 
could support either side of the argument. Id. 
124. D.C. Circuit Report, supra note 117, at 7. 
125. Id. 
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claim of misconduct. This result may occur despite the fact that no 
circuit suggests that it could not have addressed informal complaints 
before the Act was passed and that the Act does not prohibit circuits 
from addressing them now. By virtue of the passage of the Act, judges 
now focus on Congress' prescription instead of the mechanisms that 
will best resolve serious problems of misconduct. In other words, in 
relying on the Act, judges may fail to use their intrinsic authority to 
monitor themselves, and thus avoid dealing with some significant and 
difficult problems of judicial misconduct and disability. 
The Act is a classic example of how Congress, in its attempt to 
remedy one set of problems, may simultaneously exacerbate others if it 
does not foresee the full effect of proposed legislation. Congress 
passed the 1980 Act in response to a perceived need to make judges 
accountable for serious misconduct - that is, conduct for which im-
peachment might be appropriate - without resort to impeachment. 126 
Yet, most claims under the Act have involved allegations of 
nonimpeachable bad behavior. 
The ultimate effect of the 1980 Act has been to badly complicate 
the existing Administrative Office Act of 1939.127 The 1939 Act em-
powered the Councils to take "such action ... as may be necessary" to 
ensure "that the work of the district courts shall be effectively and 
expeditiously transacted."128 Unlike that of the 1980 Act, the 1939 
language was very broad, setting goals without setting specific proce-
dures like those detailed in the 1980 counterpart. In fact, even before 
the 1939 enabling statute, the circuits were meeting informally to dis-
cuss overall administration.129 
The informal disciplinary measures that were used before 1980 
were criticized not for their ineffectiveness, 130 but, rather, because they 
were employed pursuant to "secretive" proceedings; it was claimed 
that because informal actions were not pursued in public, they were 
126. See, e.g., 126 CONG. REc. 28090-93 (1980) (remarks of Sen. DeConcini); id. at 28091 
("Today's public demands that all branches of government be made accountable for their ac-
tions, including the Federal judiciary."); id. at 28093 (remarks of Sen. Nunn) ("This legislation 
represents a decade's struggle for .•• much needed judicial improvement.''). 
127. Act of Aug. 7, 1939 (Administrative Office Act of 1939), ch. SOI, §§ 306-07, S3 Stat. 
1223, 1224-2S (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 332 (1982)). 
128. Act of Aug. 7, 1939, ch. SOI, § 306, S3 Stat. 1223, 1224. 
129. See Note, supra note 68, at 1120. Although then-Judge Burger has stated that the De-
partment of Justice had oversight over judicial housekeeping machinery before the 1939 Act, see 
Burger, The Courts on Trial, 22 F.R.D. 71, 76 n.S (19S8), this is contradicted by historians. See, 
e.g., P. FISH, THE POLITICS OF FEDERAL JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION 14S-S2 (1973). 
130. But see Burbank, The Federal Judicial Discipline Act: Is Decentralized Self-Regulation 
Working?, 67 JUDICATURE 183 (1983) (stating without any convincing authority that "[t]hejudi· 
cial councils of the circuits, which some claimed had the power to discipline judges, had not 
proved to be effective"). 
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not available to Congress and citizens-at-large.131 In my view, how-
ever, Congress' resort to statutory procedures to cure a perceived need 
for public access to avenues of judicial disdpline is ill-conceived. For 
one thing, the Act does not address the alleged problem of secretive 
proceedings, because the Act itself mandates confidentiality with re-
spect to most proceedings. More importantly, the Act's design to al-
low citizen-initiated "prosecutions" of judges is an approach that was 
flatly rejected by the Framers when they adopted a cumbersome im-
peachment procedure to protect judicial independence. And, as I have 
shown, the general public's increased accessibility has induced frivo-
lous charges of misconduct while perhaps even discouraging investiga-
tion of valid charges that are not made through the formal channels. 
Moreover, those with a right and duty to have access to discipli-
nary means are untouched by the Act. Congress has always known 
that the impeachment remedy was available and has used it when 
needed. Those in the public with valid complaints - usually lawyers, 
the press, and others with legitimate information that should be 
brought to the attention of the circuit - have always managed to do 
so without additional congressional directive. Although it would be 
exceedingly difficult to substantiate, I would strongly suspect that the 
number of annual corrective actions before and after implementation 
of the 1980 Act has remained roughly the same. Yet, the judiciary as 
a whole is now burdened with the needless work generated by disaf-
fected litigants whom the Act inadvertently encourages. 
In short, the Act raises serious constitutional concerns by treading 
on judicial territory, and it results in practical misuses of judicial re-
sources. Not only should the judiciary guard its internal operations as 
a constitutional matter, it also is the most logical body for ensuring 
adherence to a standard of "good behavior," because it is familiar with 
exactly what good behavior means as a practical matter and how to 
expedite its own procedures towards this goal. 
IV. JUDICIAL ALTERNATIVES 
The informal procedures I propose are much the same as those 
that were used before the 1980 Act and that are still used today, albeit 
more restrictively, in some circuits. Admittedly, the use of writs of 
mandamus and direct reversal are constant specters over judges; they 
131. J. Browning, Report on the Implementation of the Judicial Conduct and Disability Act 
of 1980 in the Ninth Judicial Circuit 4 n.3 (Oct. 21, 1987) (unpublished report of Chief Judge, 
Ninth Circuit, to Judge Elmo Hunter, Chairman, Court Administration Committee of the Judi-
cial Conference of the United States, on file with the Michigan Law Review). 
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may function as a de facto reprimand for judicial mistakes.132 But it 
has never been assumed that mandamus or reversal are useful tools to 
deal with the ongoing problems of judicial misconduct. 133 Mandamus 
and reversal are used mainly to counter the types of "honest error" 
that, unless intentional or belligerent, do not call for punishment so 
much as correction, or "setting straight." The areas of "honest disa-
greement" that result in reversal are hardly appropriate for sanction; 
in fact, I suggest that it is precisely with respect to these areas of disa-
greement that we see the numerous frivolous claims under the Act. 
Instead, I favor informal means based on judicial persuasion and 
peer pressure'. Informal measures may range from the subtle, such as 
counselling by the Chief Judge, to the drastic, such as prompting ad-
verse publicity within the Bar or even in the general public. These 
measures can be extremely effective. According to Northern District 
of Ohio District Judge Frank Battisti, his Circuit Council passed a 
resolution in 1975 labelling a judge " 'incompetent' and 'asking' him 
to retire. The resolution somehow found its way to the press, and a 
deliberate and humiliating campaign ensued to force this judge of 30 
years' experience off the bench."134 Notably, Judge Battisti dubbed 
these informal mechanisms "sledgehammer tactics," and "cruel," be-
cause of the public humiliation to which the judge was subjected. 135 I 
do not condone the public humiliation of an elderly judge, and I agree 
that the episode probably could have been better handled with more 
discretion. However, I submit that these procedures, when used cor-
rectly, are effective and far less cruel than other weapons that Con-
gress could wield that would necessarily threaten removal. I am not 
alone in my support of these options: other judges have written on the 
effectiveness and relative grace of informal approaches. 136 
Additionally, there is no real problem with the Circuit Councils' 
independently adopting their own regulations for defining bad behav-
ior and establishing procedures and penalties for sanctioning miscre-
ants. Setting definite procedures could add some predictability to the 
process.137 Possible penalties include warnings from the group or the 
132. For comments on the use of direct reversal as a sanction, see, e.g., Berkson & Tesitor, 
Holding Federal Judges Accountable, 61 JUDICATURE 442, 449-50 (1978). 
133. See, e.g., Ward, Can the Federal Courts Keep Order in Their Own House? Appellate 
Supervision Through Mandamus and Orders of Judicial Councils, 1980 B.Y.U. L. REV. 233, 238-
47. 
134. Battisti, supra note 65, at 743. 
135. Id. at 744. 
136. See Kaufman, supra note 33, at 706-12; Dobie, A Judge Judges Judges, 1951 WASH. U. 
L.Q. 471. 
137. Cf Burbank, supra note 82 (the Judicial Conference could fashion uniform procedures 
that nevertheless permit some flexibility within the circuits); see also Burbank, supra note 123. 
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Chief Judge; removal of a judge from a particular case; changing com-
mittee assignments; changing case assignments (for example, tempo-
rarily removing a judge from the calendar if he or she is unwilling or 
unable to keep current); recommending criminal investigation; or even 
recommending impeachment proceedings.138 Concrete judicial rules 
could reinforce the pressure naturally exerted by judges over one an-
other to the point that most misconduct would be handled without 
resort to the harsh publicity Judge Battisti appropriately deplores. 
Some would challenge a procedure that allows a Judicial Council 
to sanction judges, especially if no judicial review is possible (as under 
the 1980 Act). 139 In fact, Judge Hastings made such a due process 
challenge to his investigation, 140 based on the fact that the Council 
could recommend to Congress that he forfeit his job without benefit of 
a judicial forum. This argument seems meritless because article III 
judges are assigned to hear any charges in a Council proceeding. 
While there may be fine lines to draw regarding whether a Judicial 
Council forum is truly judicial or administrative, 141 it seems that an 
accused judge will doubtless receive a truly fair and impartial forum 
through the Councils for the reasons outlined in Part II.B above. 
Judicial self-regulation is an effective tool to deal with misconduct 
because peer pressure can be a powerful force within the ranks of the 
judiciary. It should not be underestimated. A judge who has been 
derelict in her or his performance usually knows it and does not look 
forward to serious admonition from colleagues. Admonition may call 
into question one's fairness, honesty, intelligence, judgment, wisdom, 
or commitment - the precise characteristics that mark a distin-
guished career on the bench. It is the height of humifo:~tion to be 
graded poorly in these areas, or to be accused by one's own peers of 
demeaning the dignity of the office, especially pursuant to a charge of 
misconduct. The threat of peer condemnation tempers even the most 
arrogant judge, so we can be sur~ that individual independence does 
not insulate a judge from effective peer regulation. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In 1930, Professor Burke Shartel published a seminal series of arti-
cles outlining his proposals for reorganization of the federal bench, 
138. See also Berkson & Tesitor, supra note 132, at 447-50. 
139. See 28 U.S.C. § 372(c)(10) (1982). 
140. Hastings II. 829 F.2d at 107-08. 
141. Although the Supreme Court has suggested in dicta that these are administrative fora, 
see Chandler v. Judicial Council, 398 U.S. 74, 84-86 & n.7 (1970), it has been argued that these 
are, in fact, judicial proceedings. Note, supra note 68, at 1137. 
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setting the stage for much of the ensuing debate on impeachment in-
cluding the questions of the exclusivity of impeachment, and the "hia-
tus" ambiguity. Shartel argued for increased judicial involvement at 
all stages of judges' tenure: appointment, supervision, and removal. 
He argued further that his proposals were constitutional. 142 Scholars 
have debated on his terms ever since, usually either accepting or re-
jecting his premise of increased judicial involvement in its entirety. I 
have taken a different tack, building on the premise that increased ju-
dicial involvement will promote a more efficient and accountable judi-
ciary, but limiting my recommendations in deference to the Framers' 
separation of powers concerns. My proposal embraces a conclusion 
that only Congress may constitutionally remove a federal judge, but it 
also offers a theoretical underpinning for judicial compulsion of good 
behavior. On this latter point, I argue that the constitutional reference 
to "good behavior" amplifies, rather than overrides, the impeachment 
clauses. In my view, a proposal of this sort will result in a judiciary 
monitored more effectively than the 1980 Act mandates. In addition, 
this approach is more solidly grounded in the formal concepts of sepa-
ration of powers and judicial independence. 
During the entire history of our nation, we have endeavored to 
preserve an independent judiciary as a "citadel of the public justice and 
the public security."143 I conclude with the belief that judicial self-
regulation over matters that do not involve impeachable or criminal 
action is the proper approach to uphold that tradition of judicial 
independence. 
142. Shartel, Federal Judges -Appointment, Supervision and Removal - Some Possibilities 
Under the Constitution (pts. 1-3), 28 MICH. L. REV. 485, 723, 870 (1930). 
143. THE FEDERALIST, supra note 1, No. 78, at 524. 
